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Abstract
Several recent papers have argued that trade and ﬁnancial development may
be linked, either for political economy reasons, or because foreign competition
and exposure to shocks lead to changes in the demand for external ﬁnance. In
this paper we use the cross-country and time-series variation in openness to study
the relationship between trade and ﬁnance in more detail. Our results suggest that
increases in goods market openness are typically followed by sustained increases
in ﬁnancial depth.
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Many of the world’s economies are becoming more open to international trade. Not
surprisingly, this has led to renewed interest in the consequences of openness for com-
petition, technology transfer, and productivity. In this paper, we ask whether openness
promotes ﬁnancial development. We will use cross-section methods to examine the
long-run relationship, and recently developed panel data methods to examine Granger-
causality. Our panel data estimates suggest that, for lower-income countries, increases
in goods market openness are typically followed by sustained increases in ﬁnancial
development.
Trade and ﬁnance have been connected in the literature in at least two different
ways, which can be loosely characterized as supply-side and demand-side. In an im-
portant paper, Rajan and Zingales (2003) emphasize the supply-side role of interest
groups, and especially the vested interests of incumbent industrialists and ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. Incumbents, worried by the threat of entry, have strong incentives to resist
ﬁnancial development. These incentives are weakened if a country becomes more open
to foreign competition or to international ﬂo w so fc a p i t a l .I nt h i sv i e w ,g o o d sm a r k e t
openness can improve the supply of external ﬁnance, because it aligns the interests of
the economically powerful more closely with ﬁnancial development.1
In contrast, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) emphasize the role of risk diversiﬁcation.
To the extent that openness is associated with greater risks, such as increased expo-
sure to external demand shocks or foreign competition, it will create new demands for
external ﬁnance. Firms will need credit in order to overcome short-term cashﬂow prob-
lems and adverse shocks. In this view, the effects of trade on ﬁnance are likely to work
primarily through the demand side.
These long-run effects may be complemented by other, more short-lived consider-
ations. Although our empirical work examines the long-run relationship between trade
and ﬁnance, it acknowledges that short-run effects will also play a role. For example,
when developing countries liberalize trade on a major scale, such as Mexico under the
NAFTA, restructuring and investment are likely to increase the demand for external
ﬁnance. If trade liberalizations are followed by investment and lending booms, there
could be a strong association between openness and ﬁnance in the short run, whether
or not there is an association in the long run.2 Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) ﬁnd that
trade liberalizations are indeed often followed by higher investment.
1The Rajan and Zingales view assigns importance to ﬁnancial openness as well as goods market open-
ness. We discuss the role of ﬁnancial openness in more detail in section 2 below.
2One mechanism here may be information asymmetries. To the extent that performance in export
markets is a useful and observable index of a company’s productivity, increased openness can reduce
information asymmetries among different banks. Dell’Ariccia andMarquez (2005) present a formal model
in which reduced information asymmetries can generate a lending boom.
1When examining the effects of external trade on ﬁnancial depth, disentangling
cause and effect will not be straightforward, partly because ﬁnance may inﬂuence trade
as well as vice versa. Our empirical work will address this problem in two ways. First,
we follow Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) in using the
measure of “natural openness” due to Frankel and Romer (1999). We ﬁnd evidence
that openness and ﬁnance are strongly associated for higher-income countries, but not
for lower-income. Perhaps contrary to some of the ideas put forward in Rajan and Zin-
gales, we ﬁnd that openness has a much stronger association with bank-based ﬁnance
than with stock market development.
Our second approach, which forms the heart of the paper, is to use panel data meth-
ods. These allow us to exploit the substantial time series variation in goods market
openness. For example, in a subset of countries, openness has risen quite sharply. To
show this we use a standard measure of openness, namely imports plus exports, rel-
ative to GDP, all in current prices. For a sample of 82 countries, the median extent
of openness rose from 43% in 1960-64 to 66% in 1995-99. There are 59 countries in
which openness rose by at least ten percentage points over this period, and 34 in which
it rose by at least 25 percentage points. To show this pattern in more detail, ﬁgure 1
is a smoothed (kernel density) plot of the distributions for 1960-64 and 1995-99. The
rightward shift in the distribution of openness over the forty-year period is clear.3
Panel data methods allow us to examinethe consequences of increased openness for
ﬁnancial development, and to see whether timing patterns are consistent with a causal
effect. In a forty-year data set for 88 countries, we examine whether changes in open-
ness precede (Granger-cause) changes in ﬁnancial depth. From the estimated models,
we ﬁnd strong effects of openness on ﬁnancial development in the whole sample, and
for lower-income countries, but not for higher income countries. There is some evi-
dence that these effects persist into the long run, and do not simply reﬂect temporary
booms in bank lending.
It is important to note that, for lower-income countries, the panel data results in-
dicate stronger positive effects of trade than we ﬁnd in the cross-section. Increases in
openness are systematically associated with subsequent increases in ﬁnancial depth. It
is possible that the (conﬂicting) cross-section estimates are contaminated by the pres-
ence of individual effects that are correlated with openness. For the higher-income
countries, the situation is reversed: the panel data results are weaker than the cross-
section. The imprecise panel data estimates may arise partly because of the small
cross-section dimension of the higher-income panel.
3Note that this shift is not universal, and not all countries are more open now than twenty or thirty
years ago. See Dollar and Kraay (2004) for more details on trends in openness. Their analysis conﬁrms
that the time series variation in the trade share can be substantial, helping to motivate our emphasis on a
panel data approach.
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the litera-
ture on ﬁnancial development in more detail. Section 3 describes the data sources, and
the measures of ﬁnancial development that we adopt. Section 4 focuses on the cross-
section methods and results. In section 5, we discuss the methods and tests used in the
panel data analysis. Section 6 reports the panel data estimates, and can be seen as the
heart of the paper. In section 7 we brieﬂy summarize our conclusions.
2T r a d e a n d ﬁnance
In this section, we sketch the theoretical background to the paper, and expand on the
arguments in the introduction. We discuss the links between ﬁnance and growth, the
role of trade and other determinants of ﬁnancial development, and the possibility that
ﬁnance, in turn, can inﬂuence the extent and structure of trade.
Conventionally, trade is seen as a way to beneﬁt from specialization and scale
economies. But if external trade promotes ﬁnancial development, this offers a more
complex route by which trade may raise productivity and living standards. Beginning
with King and Levine (1993), the study of ﬁnance and growth has ﬂourished, and the
evidence that ﬁnancial sector development plays a role in growth is increasingly per-
suasive; Rajan and Zingales (1998) is one inﬂuential contribution. The literature on
ﬁnance and growth is reviewed by Levine (1997, 2005).
There has been less work on the determinants of ﬁnancial development, and our
work contributes to this emerging line of research. The central question is why en-
trepreneurs and ﬁrms appear to have easier access to external ﬁnance in some countries
than others. As discussed in the introduction, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that
such differences arise because of political economy considerations.4 Incumbent indus-
trial ﬁrms, and perhaps domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, will wish to block entry to
their sectors: they have a direct interest in maintaining an underdeveloped ﬁnancial sec-
tor. These incentives may weakened by openness, however. A combination of foreign
competition through external trade, and openness to capital ﬂows, will tend to align the
interests of incumbents more closely with ﬁnancial development. Although Rajan and
Zingales give most emphasis to arms-length ﬁnance (especially stock markets) some of
the arguments can be applied to bank-based external ﬁnance as well.
In support of their arguments, Rajan and Zingales document surprising long-term
swings in ﬁnance, using data for 1913 and decades since. Some countries have seen
long-term declines in the importance of external ﬁnance relative to GDP, before a resur-
gence in the 1980s and 1990s. An attractive feature of the Rajan and Zingales theory
4For a general discussion of the political economy of ﬁnancial development, see Pagano and Volpin
(2001a).
3is that it can explain these reversals in political economy terms. Openness to trade was
relatively low in the wake of the Great Depression, and even the advanced industrial
economies maintained capital controls for several decades after 1945, motivating the
familiar point that the economy was less globalized in mid-century than at the begin-
ning and end of the twentieth century. These reductions in openness, perhaps helping to
create a political constituency opposed to ﬁnancial sector development, could explain
the U-shaped path that has been taken by the importance of external ﬁnance relative to
GDP.5
Other mechanisms that could link trade and ﬁnance do not rely as strongly on po-
litical economy, and give more emphasis to the demand side. As discussed in the in-
troduction, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) argue that openness may be associated with
greater risks, including exposure to external shocks and foreign competition. This will
encourage the development of ﬁnancial markets that can be used to diversify such risks,
and that allow ﬁrms to overcome short-term cashﬂow problems or adverse shocks.6
Openness and ﬁnancial development may also be linked in simpler ways. The
cross-country study of Levine and Renelt (1992) identiﬁed a robust correlation between
openness and the share of investment in GDP, and if trading economies are also high
investment economies, this could promote ﬁnancial development. Openness may also
inﬂuence the demand for external ﬁnance through the nature of specialization and sec-
toral structure, or through the pace of innovation and technology transfer, activities that
are likely to make intensive use of external ﬁnance.
Our central focus is goods market openness, but previous research also points to
the importance of ﬁnancial openness: for example, the extent of restrictions on equity
ownership by foreign investors. Alessandria and Qian (2005) use a formal model to
argue that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the efﬁciency of do-
mestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, while Chinn and Ito (2005) and Law and Demetriades
(2005) consider the empirical evidence. There are at least three good reasons for com-
plementing these studies with a consideration of goods market openness. First, goods
market openness will be more relevant for the many developing countries wheredomes-
tic equity markets are absent or small in size. Second, there is often richer time series
variation in goods market openness than in measures of capital controls.7 Third, goods
5A more ambitious argument is that political forces lead either to a ‘corporatist’ political settlement,
withlowinvestorprotectionandhighemployment protection, ora non-corporatist(Anglo-Saxon) outcome
with ﬂexible labour markets and greater ﬁnancial depth (Pagano and Volpin 2001b). Commentary in
the media often assumes, perhaps wrongly, that increased trade and globalization has made a corporatist
settlement harder to sustain, providing another way to link trade and ﬁnance.
6The evidence for this should not be overstated. Using stock market data for emerging markets, Li
et al. (2004) ﬁnd that goods market openness is associated with greater market-wide variation, but not
greater ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation.
7The availability of long spans of data on goods market openness lends itself to conventional panel
data methods. In contrast, given the discrete nature of many capital account liberalizations, event studies
4market openness and ﬁnancial openness are not independent. The empirical work of
Aizenman and Noy (2003), Aizenman (2004) and Chinn and Ito (2005) suggests that
capital account liberalization is often preceded by goods market openness, perhaps be-
cause trade integration makes restrictions on capital ﬂows harder to sustain.
As background to our work, we now consider other determinants of ﬁnancial depth.
Several contributions have examined the effects of the legal, regulatory and macroeco-
nomic environment on the functioning of the banking sector and equity markets. Most
prominently, La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the origins of the legal code are im-
portant for ﬁnancial development, because legal systems differ in their treatment of
creditors and shareholders, and in contract enforcement. La Porta et al. argue that the
English common law tradition protects the rights of minority shareholders and credi-
tors, while the French civil code is associated with less efﬁcient contract enforcement,
weaker investor protection and possibly higher corruption. Countries with German or
Scandinavian legal origins are said to have intermediate levels of investor protection
and contract enforcement.8
Whether or not the origins of the legal code matter, government regulation clearly
plays a strong role. The starting point of the arguments in Rajan and Zingales (2003)
is that government regulation is needed to ensure effective contract enforcement, and
transparency in accounting and disclosure. Regulations concerning information dis-
closure, accountings standards, permissible practice of banks and deposit insurance do
appear to have material effects on ﬁnancial development (Mayer and Sussman 2001).
Less central to the current paper, the macroeconomic environment may also be
relevant. Huybens and Smith (1999) examine theoretically, and Boyd, Levine and
Smith (2001) empirically, the effects of inﬂation on ﬁnancial depth. They conclude
that economies with higher inﬂation rates are likely to have smaller, less active, and
less efﬁcient banks and equity markets.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that ﬁnancial development can, in turn, inﬂuence
the structure and extent of trade. Two papers by Beck (2002, 2003) have examined this
issue in detail. Drawing on the arguments of Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002)
develops a model in which countries with better-developed ﬁnancial markets will tend
to have a comparative advantage in manufacturing.9 Using a 30-year panel with 65
countries, he shows that ﬁnancial depth is associated with a higher level of manufactur-
ing exports and a higher trade balance in manufactured goods. In a companion paper,
may be the best approach in that context, as in Henry (2003).
8As with any innovative line of research, this is not without its critics. Looking at historical data,
Rajan and Zingales (2003) ﬁnd that common law legal codes have not always been associated with greater
ﬁnancial development. They argue that law could play a stronger role in ﬁltering the effects of interest
groups and incentives than in inﬂuencing the overall level of ﬁnancial development.
9Recent work by Ju and Wei (2005) and Wynne (2005) also develops connections between ﬁnancial
development and trade specialization.
5Beck (2003) shows that economies with greater ﬁnancial depth have higher manufac-
turing export shares and higher trade balances in industries that rely more on external
ﬁnance. These results help to motivate our Granger-causality approach: since ﬁnance
may inﬂuence trade, as well as vice versa, evidence on timing becomes especially im-
portant.
3T h e d a t a
This section describes the data and variables that we will use in our analysis. Section
3.1 describes the data on openness and GDP. In section 3.2, we will outline some of the
widely used measures of ﬁnancial development. Our empirical work will combine the
standard measures into aggregate indices of ﬁnancial development, an approach that we
describe in section 3.3. Deﬁnitions of the main variables we use, and information on
data sources, can be found in Table 1.
3.1 Basic data
Our cross-section sample relates to the period 1990-2001. We have excluded countries
with populations of less than 500,000 in 1990, using population data from the Penn
World Table (PWT).10 We also exclude transition economies from the sample.
To measure initial GDP in our regressions, we use real chain-weighted GDP per
capita (denoted RGDPCH in PWT 6.1) averaged over 1988-90 to lessen the effect of
temporary measurement errors and departures from trend. The data on openness are
also from PWT 6.1. Openness is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided
by GDP, in either current prices (OPENC) or constant international prices (OPENK),
averaged over 1988-1990. Following Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002), we always exclude
Hong Kong and Singapore, two city-states for which openness is unusually high, re-
ﬂecting transit trade and production that involves a high import content (for example,
electronics). We also exclude other countries for which measured openness exceeds
150%.
In order to capture the geographic predisposition to trade, we use the measure of
natural openness due to Frankel and Romer (1999) and call this CTRADE, for con-
structed trade share. Information on the country of legal origin, and classiﬁcations by
income levels and export specialization, are obtained from the Global Development
Network (GDN) Growth Database. To keep sample sizes reasonably large, our empir-
ical work aggregates the GDN income classes into two larger groups: lower-income
countries made up of low-income and lower-middle income countries, and higher-
income countries made up of high-income and upper-middle income countries.
10The exact source is version 6.1 due to Heston et al. (2002).
63.2 Standard measures of ﬁnancial development
A number of measures of ﬁnancial development have been used in recent work. Our
b a s i cd a t ao nﬁnancial development are from the Financial Structure Database intro-
duced by Beck et al. (2000). We average standard indicators over 1990-2001, omitting
any observations for which fewer than three years of data available. We now sum-
marize in more detail the available indicators, drawing on Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999) in particular. We start with indicators of bank-based ﬁnancial depth, which play
the dominant role in our empirical work, and then turn to indicators of stock market
development.
For measuring overall ﬁnancial development, an especially popular measure is the
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, based on the liquid liabilities of the ﬁnancial system
(currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of bank and nonbank ﬁnancial
intermediaries). ThismeasurehasbeenusedbyMcKinnon(1973)andKingandLevine
(1993) among others; we denote this measure LLY, asis standard in the literature. Other
widely used measures include the ratio to GDP of credit issued to the private sector by
banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries (denoted PRIVO) and the ratio of commercial
bank assets to the sum of commercial bank assets and central bank assets (denoted
BTOT). LLY,PRIVO and BTOT arehighlycorrelated. Theywillbeusedtoconstructthe
main indicator of ﬁnancial depth in our later panel data analysis, given the availability
of long spans of data for these measures.
The Beck et al. (2000) database also includes two measures of the efﬁciency of
ﬁnancial intermediation. The variable OVC is the ratio of overhead costs to total bank
assets. In the short run, high overhead costs may be related to investments by compet-
itive banks in improving ﬁnancial services, but over longer time spans, high overhead
costs are likely to reﬂect inefﬁciency and a lack of competition. A second measure, the
N e tI n t e r e s tM a r g i no rNIM, equals the difference between bank interest income and
interest expenses, divided by total assets. Again, high values for this variable tend to
suggest a lack of competition among banks.
Recently, some studies have taken a wider view of ﬁnancial development. Levine
and Zervos (1998) discuss the independent effects of banks and stock markets on eco-
nomic growth, rather than focusing on simply the extent of intermediation. Some mea-
sures of stock market development, such as stock market turnover, can be seen as in-
dices of ﬁnancial sector efﬁciency or sophistication rather than simply ﬁnancial depth.
As well as a standard measure, market capitalization relative to GDP (MCAP), Levine
and Zervos (1998) use Total Value Traded (TVT) as an indicator of stock market activ-
ity. This is the ratio of trades in domestic shares (on domestic exchanges) to GDP, and
can be used to gauge market liquidity relative to the size of the economy. Finally, the
Turnover Ratio (TOR) is the ratio of trades in domestic shares to market capitalization.
7High values for TOR indicate a more active equity market, which may be associated
with a relatively efﬁcient allocation of capital.
3.3 New measures of ﬁnancial development
The indicators described in the above section are standard. Since they are all intended
as proxies for an underlying, latent variable - ﬁnancial development - there may be sig-
niﬁcant advantages in combining them. This could help to alleviate measurement errors
and outlier problems that might be associated with the use of a single indicator. We take
one of the simplest possible approaches, namely to use principal components analysis.
The method takes N speciﬁc indicators and yields new indices (the principal compo-
nents) P1,P 2,...PN that are mutually uncorrelated and so capture different dimensions
of the data. In our work we use solely the ﬁrst principal component. Formally, this
is deﬁned by a vector of weights a =( a1,a 2,...,aN)0 on the (standardized) indica-
tors X =( X1,X 2,...X N)0 such that a0X has the maximum variance for any possible
weights, subject to the constraint that a0a =1 .
We use this method to aggregate different sets of components into ﬁve new mea-
sures of ﬁnancial depth. Their structure can be seen from Table 2, together with the
weights on each component.11 Our ﬁrst aggregate measure is designed to capture over-
all ﬁnancial development, and is denoted FD. This is based on the complete set of eight
components, namely LLY, PRIVO, BTOT, OVC, NIM, MCAP, TVT and TOR.T h eﬁrst
principal component accounts for 63% of the variation in these eight indicators. Here
and subsequently, all the weights have the expected signs: positive for all variables
except OVC and NIM, given that high values for these latter two variables indicate in-
efﬁciency in the ﬁnancial sector.
Our second measure, FDSIZE, is effectively the average of LLY and MCAP,a n d
provides a summary of the combined importance of bank-based and equity-based ﬁ-
nance, relative to GDP. In contrast, FDEFF i sd e s i g n e dt oc a p t u r eﬁnancial efﬁciency,
and is based on OVC, NIM, TVT and TOR.Af o u r t hm e a s u r e ,FDBANK,c a p t u r e st h e
extent of bank-based intermediation. This uses LLY, PRIVO, BTOT, OVC and NIM,a n d
accounts for 71% of the variation in these ﬁve indicators. FDSTOCK captures equity
market development, and accounts for 86% of the variation in MCAP, TVT and TOR.
Finally, a measure of ﬁnancial depth, FDEPTH,u s e so n l yLLY, PRIVO and BTOT,a n d
accounts for 74% of the variation in these indicators.
By construction, all the new indices have a mean of zero. Panel A of Table 3 pro-
vides some other descriptive statistics for the new indicators and their components. In
panel C of Table 3, we present the correlations among the new measures. As expected,
11All components are measured in natural logarithms, which helps to reduce outlier problems in this
particular application, and are then standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation.
8they are highly correlated with one another. It is interesting to note that by far the
lowest correlation is between FDBANK and FDSTOCK (0.63), reﬂecting the tendency
for intermediation to be either bank-based or equity-based. Another interesting aspect
of Table 3 is that the correlations between openness and the new indicators, shown in
Panel C, are noticeably higher than when the original proxies are used (Panel B). This is
consistent with the idea that aggregation of the original measures has reduced measure-
ment error. The correlations with openness are still low, but these simple associations
do not control for the level of development and other inﬂuences on ﬁnancial depth.
We now take a look at scatter plots of the trade-ﬁnance relationship. Figure 2 plots
two measures of ﬁnancial development, LLY and FD, against openness. Openness and
LLY are measured in natural logarithms, which helps to reduce outlier problems in this
case. In ﬁgure 2, there is some evidence that ﬁnancial development and openness are
positively related, although outliers such as Japan (coded JPN in the ﬁgure) and El
Salvador (SLV) may obscure the relationship to some extent. In ﬁgure 3, we present
partialscatterplotsbetweenthesamesetsofvariables, afterconditioningoninitialGDP
per capita, and legal origin dummies (for English, French and German legal origin).
Again, there is some evidence of a positive association between ﬁnancial development
and openness, whether using LLY or the additional information contained in the new
indicator FD.
4 Cross-section: methods and results
4.1 Cross-section methods
Our basic framework will be regressions of the form:
Finance= α + β log(OPENC)+f(controls)+ε (1)
Here Finance is the level of ﬁnancial development, based on either individual
ﬁnancial indicators, or our new aggregate indices, measured over 1990-2001. The ex-
planatory variables are the natural logarithm of openness, and some controls. As in
Rajan and Zingales (2003) we condition on the log of real GDP per capita, to control
for the demand for ﬁnance. Our other explanatory variables are dummies for country of
legal origin, as in La Porta et al. (1998), Beck et al. (2003) and Berkowitz et al. (2003).
Figures 2 and 3 suggested that inﬂuential outliers could play an important role in
any cross-section analysis. To increase robustness in this dimension, we estimate our
models in two stages. We ﬁrst apply median or least absolute deviation regression,
in which the parameters are chosen to minimise the sum of the absolute values of the
9residuals, rather than the sum of their squares as in OLS. We then exclude any ob-
servations for which the LAD residual is more than two standard deviations from the
mean residual, before estimating the model by OLS or GMM. This procedure is not
perfect, but should help to exclude the worst outliers, including some that would not be
identiﬁed by more conventional OLS diagnostics.
Once outliers have been excluded, we run straightforward regressions using OLS.
Since there are many reasons that openness could be correlated with the error term in
such a regression - including reverse causality, measurement error and omitted vari-
ables - we supplement OLS with IV procedures. We treat openness as an endogenous
explanatory variable, and use the Frankel-Romer (1999) trade share as an instrument.12
Their work models openness using the size of the domestic population (given that large
countries trade a lower fraction of GDP internationally) and the proximity of large ex-
ternal markets. Our maintained assumption will be that this measure of “natural open-
ness” affects ﬁnancial development through external trade, but is uncorrelated with the
error term in the structural equation. This rules out, among other things, any inﬂuences
of geography on ﬁnancial development that act through routes other than openness.
FortheFrankel-Romermeasureof naturalopenness to bea good instrument, itmust
be correlated with openness, after conditioning on other (exogenous) variables. We
investigate instrument relevance using a F-test on the excluded instrument in the ﬁrst-
stage regression of 2SLS (the reduced form regression of openness on all the exogenous
variables, including natural openness). These tests suggest that natural openness is not
a weak instrument, consistent with the ﬁndings in Frankel and Romer (1999).
We use 2SLS to construct diagnostic tests, including a test for heteroskedasticity
based on Pagan and Hall (1983). Compared to OLS, the use of IV procedures is as-
sociated with a loss of efﬁciency if openness is uncorrelated with the error term. We
therefore implement two tests for endogeneity. The ﬁrst is a standard Wu-Hausman test
based on auxiliary regressions in the 2SLS case.13 The second is a difference-Sargan
type test, sometimes called the C statistic in the GMM context. Not surprisingly, the
results are close to those of the auxiliary regression approach. Both tests indicate that
openness is endogenous in many of the models we consider.
4.2 Cross-section results
This section presents cross-country regression results. To anticipate some of our main
ﬁndings, partitioning the sample into a higher-income group and a lower-income group
will be an important step. Openness is associated with ﬁnancial development in higher-
12This follows similar analyses in Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Stulz and Williamson (2003), among
others.
13See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 237-242) for details of this approach.
10income countries, but the evidence for this is much weaker in the lower-income sample.
We ﬁnd this when using the individual ﬁnance measures and also when using the new
aggregate indicators.
We present our ﬁrst set of results in Table 4. We report the point estimates and
heteroskedasticity-robust p-values only for openness; the estimates for initial GDP and
the legal origin dummies are not reported, to save space. The relationship between
openness and ﬁnance is weak for the sample as a whole. In the higher-income group of
countries, however, Panel A of Table 5 shows that openness and bank-based ﬁnance are
strongly associated. This result emerges whether using OLS or GMM, and also when
using individual ﬁnance measures like LLY and PRIVO (results not reported).
In Panel B of Table 5, we consider the lower-income group. Here, the GMM re-
sults suggest that, if anything, the more open countries are less ﬁnancially developed,
although these results are fragile. The R2 f o rt h eO L Sr e g r e s s i o n si sm u c hl o w e ri n
the lower-income sample than in the higher-income sample, suggesting that these re-
gressions omit important determinants of ﬁnancial depth. One possibility is that, even
conditional on the level of income, countries that specialize in primary commodities are
likely to have weak ﬁnancial development, relative to countries where manufacturing
activity has a greater role. This effect may be especially pronounced for economies
dominated by point-source resources like oil or diamonds, since oil and mineral ex-
traction is often carried out by the state or multinationals, implying less demand for
external ﬁnance at any given level of income. We have explored this effect using export
classiﬁcations from the GDN database, and a dummy variable for exporters of point-
source resources, based on the work of Isham et al. (2002). Financial development
is signiﬁcantly lower for primary commodity exporters (results available on request)
but controlling for this effect, or splitting the sample by export classiﬁcation, does not
strengthen the estimated effect of openness.
We have considered the robustness of these ﬁndings in a number of other dimen-
sions. One simple test is to replace the trade share in current prices (OPENC) with the
trade share evaluated at prices that are constant across countries (OPENK). This makes
little difference to the results, tending to weaken the effect of openness only slightly.
We have also experimented with aggregate measures of ﬁnancial development in which
the individual components are not in logarithms. Again, the results are very similar to
those shown in Tables 4 and 5.
In summary, these regressions indicate that external trade is associated with ﬁnan-
cial development in richercountries. Theseregressionshave relatively high explanatory
power. The trade effect is robust to treating openness as endogenous, and emerges for
many different indicators of ﬁnancial development. Perhaps contrary to some of the
arguments in Rajan and Zingales (2003), the trade effect is stronger for bank-based ﬁ-
11nance than it is for equity-based ﬁnance. For poorer countries, the picture is a great
deal more ambiguous. We ﬁnd scant evidence that trade and ﬁnance are positively as-
sociated. The GMM estimates indicate that the association may even be negative, but
there is also evidence that important determinants of ﬁnancial development have been
omitted.
5 Panel data methods
Cross-section methods are simple and easy to interpret, but have some important weak-
nesses. Relationships may be artiﬁcially created or obscured by unobserved hetero-
geneity and outliers. The use of panel data can overcome these problems, and has other
advantages. We can look at relationships over time, to see whether increases in open-
ness are followed by increases in ﬁnancial depth, and to distinguish between short-run
and long-run effects. In principle, we can also use the time series variation to obtain
more precise estimates of the parameters of interest.
For our panel data analysis, we will use 88 countries. The data are ﬁve-year av-
erages over the period 1960-99, giving a maximum of 8 cross-sections per country,
although the panel is unbalanced. As in the empirical growth literature, averaging the
data over ﬁve-year intervals means that the results are less likely to be driven by co-
movements at very short horizons. Averaging is also likely to lessen the impact of
measurement error, and simpliﬁes the speciﬁcation of the dynamics of the model. We
will see that, even using ﬁve-year averages, we need an AR(2) rather than an AR(1)
model to capture the dynamics adequately. This implies that a model based on annual
d a t aw o u l db el i k e l yt or e q u i r em a n yp a r a m e t e r s . 14
To measure ﬁnancial development for as many countries as possible, we drop the
indicators for which data are incomplete, and construct a measure FDEPTH. As before,
this is the ﬁrst principal component of LLY, PRIVO,a n dBTOT, but now the loadings
are based on the pooled cross-section time series data for the individual measures. As
before, our openness data are from version 6.1 of the Penn World Table.
Wewill carry outa paneldata versionofa Granger-causalitytest. Given that causal-
ity may run in either direction, we cannot treat openness as strictly exogenous. Instead,
we estimate partial adjustment models that allow feedback, using sequential moment
conditions to identify the model. We provide a brief introduction to this approach,
which is covered in more detail in Arellano (2003, chapter 8).15 We start with the sim-
ple AR(1) case, and then consider the AR(2) model that seems more appropriate for
14For a complementary approach that does make use of annual data, but for a smaller number of coun-
tries, see Law and Demetriades (2005).
15We draw on some aspects of Arellano’s presentation, including his notation. Another useful introduc-
tion can be found in Bond (2002), and a briefer overview in Durlauf et al. (2005).
12this application.
The most common approach in the empirical literature would be to specify an
AR(1) model of the form:
yit = α1yit−1 + β1xit−1 + ηi + φt + vit | α1 |< 1 (2)
i =1 ,2,...88 and t =2 ...8
where in our application yit w i l lb eam e a s u r eo fﬁnancial development and xit
will be openness. The model allows for unobserved heterogeneity through the indi-
vidual effect ηi capturing the combined effect of time-invariant omitted variables. φt
is a common time effect, while vit is the disturbance term. We assume that xit is po-
tentially correlated with the individual effect ηi and may be correlated with vit,b u t
is uncorrelated with future shocks vit+1, vit+2, ... Under these assumptions, xit−1 is
predetermined with respect to vit and the errors can be assumed to satisfy sequential
moment conditions of the form
E(vit | yt−1
i ,x t−1
i ,η i,φ t)=0 (3)
where yt−1
i =( yi1,y i2...., yi,t−1)0 and xt−1
i =( xi1,x i2...., xi,t−1)0.
When these moment conditions are satisﬁed, the transient errors vit are condition-
ally serially uncorrelated, for any j>0
E(vitvit−j | yt−1
i ,x t−1
i ,η i,φ t)=0 (4)
and this implies (by the law of iterated expectations) that
E(vitvit−j)=0 (5)
Under these assumptions, the model can be estimated by ﬁrst-differencing equation
(2) to eliminate the individual effects, and then using lagged levels of yit and xit dated
t − 2 as instruments. But a more efﬁcient GMM estimator can be obtained by using
more of the available moment conditions, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
They suggest using all available lagged levels of xit and yit dated t − 2 and earlier, so
that the relevant moment conditions take the form
E(yit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 2;t =3 ,..,8
E(xit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 2;t =3 ,..,8 (6)
13(Therearealsosixmomentconditionsassociatedwiththeperiod-speciﬁcconstants,
which we omit for simplicity.)
We call this estimator DIF-GMM. Given the strict assumptions needed for identiﬁ-
cation, it is important that speciﬁcation tests are applied to the estimated models. First
of all, we use the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-differenced errors. We expect to ﬁndﬁrst-order serial correlation in the differenced
errors, but second-order serial correlation would imply that (4), and therefore some of
the moment conditions, are invalid. We can also use a Sargan-type test to assess the
model speciﬁcation and overidentifying restrictions (also known in the GMM context
as Hansen’s J test).
A number of limitations of DIF-GMM should be noted. A well-known property of
two-stepGMMestimators is thatthe standard errorsmay be severely biased downwards
in small samples. To address this problem, we adopt the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite
sample correction to the standard errors. All reported standard errors and test statistics
are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Importantly, when using DIF-GMM, we also experiment with restricted instrument
sets. This can help to avoid the overﬁtting biases that are sometimes associated with
using all the available (linear) moment conditions. Throughout the paper, our ‘reduced’
instrument sets use no lags dated further back than t − 4. Using fewer moment condi-
tions can also help to improve the power of Sargan-type tests; see for example Bowsher
(2002).
A perhaps more fundamental weakness of DIF-GMM is that lagged levels of the se-
ries may be weak instruments for ﬁrst differences, especially when the series are highly
persistent, or the variance of the individual effects (ηi) is high relative to the variance
of the transient shocks (vit). In this case, identiﬁcation of the model can sometimes
be improved by making additional assumptions on the initial conditions of the process.
Under assumptions developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998), the “system GMM” estimator can be used to alleviate the weak instruments
problem.
This estimator (which we call SYS-GMM) adds a system of equations in levels
to that in ﬁrst differences. To achieve identiﬁcation, the lagged ﬁrst-differences of
the series (yit,x it) dated t − 1 are used as instruments in the untransformed (levels)
equations. The additional moment conditions are
E[∆yit−1(ηi + vit)] = 0 t =3 ,..,8 (7)
E[∆xit−1(ηi + vit)] = 0 t =3 ,..,8 (8)
Note that, given these moment conditions, differences lagged two periods or more
14are then redundant as instruments for the levels equations, because the corresponding
moment conditions are linear combinations of those already in use.
The simulation results in Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that the combined or
system GMM estimator is more robust than difference GMM to weak instrument bi-
ases, and this method has become increasingly popular in the cross-country empirical
literature. Note that the validity of the additional moment conditions used by this esti-
mator (or a subset of them) can be tested using an incremental Sargan statistic. Also, in
implementing SYS-GMM, we will again restrict the instrument set, to avoid overﬁtting
biases. As before, in the transformed equations, we use only lagged levels at dates t−2,
t − 3, and t − 4 as instruments.
Our later empirical work will suggest that the AR(1) speciﬁcation is invalid for this
particular application. We therefore move to an AR(2) model, with two lags of the
dependent variable, and two lags of openness. This model is given by:
yit = α1yit−1 + α2yit−2 + β1xit−1 + β2xit−2 + ηi + φt + vit
i =1 ,2,...88 and t =3 ...8 (9)
and so the ﬁrst-differenced equation is:
∆yit = α1∆yit−1 + α2∆yit−2 + β1∆xit−1 + β2∆xit−2 + φt − φt−1 + ∆vit
i =1 ,2,...88 and t =4 ...8 (10)
Now the relevant moment conditions for DIF-GMM are:
E(yit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 2;t =4 ,..,8 (11)
E(xit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 2;t =4 ,..,8
Note that, perhaps surprisingly, we can continue to use moment conditions based on
the lagged levels yit−2 and xit−2 for the equations in ﬁrst differences, even when yit−2
and xit−2 are included in the untransformed model. Arellano (2003, section 6.7) is an
example of this approach. To see how this works, it can alternatively be interpreted
as exploiting the exogeneity of ∆yit−2 and ∆xit−2 in the ﬁrst-differenced equations,
together with the use of lagged levels dated t − 3 and earlier:
E(∆yit−2∆vit)=0 t =4 ,..,8
E(∆xit−2∆vit)=0 t =4 ,..,8
E(yit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 3;t =4 ,..,8
E(xit−s∆vit)=0 s ≥ 3;t =4 ,..,8
15But clearly these moment conditions are linear combinations of the set (11). This
alternative, equivalent way of writing down the moment conditions helps to clarify that,
in the AR(2) model, there is a sense in which identiﬁcation relies on lagged levels dated
t−3and earlier. (This can be seen more explicitly by considering howa 2SLS approach
would be implemented.) Since these longer lags may be weak instruments, this again
suggests the potential usefulness of the system GMM estimator in this context.
IntheAR(2)model, onehypothesisofeconomicinterestisthejointnullβ1 = β2 =
0, which can be interpreted as a panel data test for Granger-causality. Although a Wald-
type test of this restriction could be implemented, we use an alternative approach. This
is to estimate both the unrestricted and the restricted models using the same moment
conditions, and compare their (two-step) Sargan statistics using an incremental Sargan
test of the form:
DRU = n(J(˜ γ) − J(ˆ γ))
where J(˜ γ) is the minimized GMM criterion for the restricted model, J(ˆ γ) for
the unrestricted model, and n is the number of observations. Under the null, DRU is
asymptotically distributed as χ2
r where r is the number of restrictions. The intuition
for the test is that, if the parameter restrictions are valid, the moment conditions should
remain valid even in the restricted model. For more details, see Bond et al. (2001a) and
Bond and Windmeijer (2005).
We now turn to some additional issues of interpretation raised by the use of an
AR(2) model. First of all, we may be interested in the stability of the estimated model.
For stability we require the roots of the relevant lag polynomial, namely the bracketed
term on the left-hand side of:
¡
1 − α1L − α2L2¢
yit = β1xit−1 + β2xit−2 + ηi + φt + vit
to lie outside the unit circle. This can easily be checked by either dynamic simula-
tion or direct calculation; see for example Hamilton (1994, p. 17-18) on the latter. The
majority of our estimated models are stable, the main exceptions arising when pooled
OLS is used rather than our preferred ﬁxed-effects methods.
If the model is stable, we can calculate a point estimate for the long-run effect of
openness on ﬁnancial development:
βLR =
β1 + β2
(1 − α1 − α2)
We can estimate an approximate standard error for this long-run effect using the
delta method. However, we should note that the long-run effect, as a nonlinear function
16of the modelparameters, may be imprecisely estimated. Inparticular, ifthesumα1+α2
is close to one and imprecisely estimated, the data can appear consistent with very high
values for the long-run effect, because the ratio quickly blows up as α1+α2 nearsunity.
Since the conﬁdence interval generated by the delta method is, perhaps mistakenly,
assumed to be symmetric around the point estimate, it may well overlap zero too often.
For this reason, we complement the delta method with a test of the restriction
β1 + β2 =0 . If this restriction is rejected, it suggests that there is evidence for a
long-run effect of openness on ﬁnancial development. If the restriction holds and the
parameters are non-zero (β2 = −β1 6=0 )t h e nﬁnancial development depends on the
change in openness, and not on its level. This would be consistent with a story in which
increases in openness, through restructuring and investment, lead to a short-term boom
in lending that does not persist into the long run. Again, we will test this restriction on
the coefﬁcients using a criterion-based approach.
In some of our estimated models, the lag polynomial associated with the depen-
dent variable has one root close to unity, indicating a high degree of persistence. This
makes it especially relevant to ask how the estimation methods will perform when the
data-generating process is characterized by a high degree of persistence. The GMM es-
timators will remain consistent, because the relevant asymptotics here are for large N,
ﬁxed T.Aq u a l i ﬁcation is that in the case of an exact unit root, the moment conditions
used in DIF-GMM are no longer sufﬁcient to identify the parameters. Identiﬁcation
may require the use of mean stationarity assumptions, as in the system GMM estima-
tor; see Arellano (2003, p. 116) for the AR(1) case.
Finally, we can test for unobserved heterogeneity using a procedure originally sug-
gested by Holtz-Eakin (1988). In the absence of individual effects, the following ad-
ditional moment conditions become valid, corresponding to the use of lagged levels as
instruments in the levels equations:
E[yit−1(yit − α1yit−1 − α2yit−2 − β1xit−1 − β2xit−2 − φt )] = 0 (12)
E[xit−1(yit − α1yit−1 − α2yit−2 − β1xit−1 − β2xit−2 − φt )] = 0
t =3 ,..,8
The validity of these additional moment conditions, which can be tested using an
incremental Sargan test relative to difference or system GMM, then becomes a simple
test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (where the null is no heterogeneity).
One motivation for using this test is that, if individual effects are not present, pooled
OLS will be a consistent estimator, although not fully efﬁcient given the likely presence
of heteroskedasticity.
176P a n e l d a t a r e s u l t s
This section presents the results of our panel data analysis. The main ﬁndings can
be summarized as follows. In the short run (here, 5-10 years) increases in openness
are followed by increases in ﬁnancial depth. For the whole sample, and a sample of
lower-income countries, this result is robust across different estimation methods, and
to variation in the choice of moment conditions. Not surprisingly, the long-run effect is
estimated less precisely, but in most cases we can reject the restriction that β1+β2 =0 .
This suggests that the effect of openness on ﬁnancial development persists into the long
run, although the extent of support for this hypothesis varies with the precise choice of
moment conditions.
We will consider OLS estimates, Within Groups (WG) estimates, and two versions
of difference GMM. All models include a full set of time dummies. The ﬁrst version
of DIF-GMM uses all available linear moment conditions, while the second does not
use any lags dated further back than t − 4. We will also consider three versions of sys-
tem GMM, the ﬁrst using both sets of moment conditions (7) and (8). The second two
versions use separately either (7), which we call SYS-GMM-1, or (8), which we call
SYS-GMM-2. This approach helps to avoid overﬁtting and also reﬂects the possibil-
ity that the system GMM assumptions may be incorrect. For example, if the countries
with relatively small individual effects (and hence tending to be less developed ﬁnan-
cially) are also the countries in which openness has increased the fastest, the moment
conditions in (8) would be invalid.
First of all, we consider an AR(1) model of the form often studied in the cross-
country empirical literature. These results are shown in Table 6.16 The table provides
several reasons to believe this model is badly mis-speciﬁed. One source for concern
is the evidence for second-order serial correlation. In the case of system GMM, in the
ﬁnal column, the Sargan statistic also suggests that either the model speciﬁcation or the
moment conditions are invalid.17
Withtheseproblemsin mind, wedonotgivefurtherconsideration toAR(1) models.
We turn instead to AR(2) models of the form:
16All our panel data estimates are obtained using the xtabond2 package for Stata, written by David
Roodman. We were able to obtain almost identical resultsand test statistics using theDPD for PcGive
software described in Doornik et al. (2002).
17More subtly, it is worth noting that the autoregressive parameter estimated by DIF-GMM or SYS-
GMM does not lie in the interval deﬁned by the OLS and WG estimates. Since the OLS and WG estimates
of the autoregressive parameter should be biased in opposite directions, a consistent estimate of this pa-
rameter might be expected to lie between these two extremes (see Bond et al. 2001b for more discussion).
Again, this tends to call into question the validity of the moment conditions, and may also hint at weak
instrument biases.
18yit = α1yit−1 + α2yit−2 + β1xit−1 + β2xit−2 + ηi + φt + vit
i =1 ,2,...88 and t =3 ...8
We will be especially interested in whether the level of ﬁnancial development de-
pends primarily on the change in openness, or the level. To examine this, we will test
the restriction that β1 + β2 =0 ,i nw h i c hc a s eβ1xit−1 + β2xit−2 = β1∆xit−1.W e
will see that the degree of support for this interpretation is limited. It is always strongest
when pooled OLS is used, typically less strong under system GMM, and weakest under
difference GMM. In general, when we allow for ﬁxed effects, we ﬁnd evidence that the
effects of openness persist into the long run.
Table 7 presents results for the whole sample of 88 countries.18 Recall that, when-
ever we apply the GMM estimators, we report tests for serial correlation (ﬁrst- and
second-order), the Sargan statistic, a test for Granger causality (β1 = β2 =0 ), a test
for a long-run effect (β1 + β2 =0 ) and the implied point estimate and approximate
standard error of the long-run effect. We report the tests of restrictions on parameters,
and long-run effects, for OLS and Within Groups also. In the OLS and WG cases, the
tests of restrictions are based on conventional Wald tests.
Looking at Table 7, the ﬁrst point to note is that, across all the estimation methods,
we ﬁnd strong evidence that increases in openness are associated with increases in
ﬁnancial depth in the short-run. The coefﬁcient on the ﬁrst lag of openness is positively
signed and signiﬁcantly different from zero across all seven models reported in Table
7. The effect of the second lag of openness varies more across the models. In the
system GMM estimates, especially, we ﬁnd evidence that the coefﬁcient on the second
lag of openness is negatively signed, which points to the importance of specifying the
dynamics carefully. The Granger-causality test rejects the null of non-causality at the
5% level for all seven models.
The long-run effect is less clear. In the ﬁnal two rows of the Table, we report the
point estimate and approximate standard error associated with the long-run effect. In
the case of the WG estimates, and the two varieties of DIF-GMM estimates, we ﬁnd a
stable long-run effect, and one that is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level
in columns 2 and 4. When we turn to the different versions of SYS-GMM (columns
5-7) the long-run effect is less precisely estimated.19 Note, however, that whenever we
18Note that, following our earlier discussion, it may again be tempting to compare the ﬁrst autoregres-
sive parameter in the GMM estimates with that obtained under WG and OLS; but this would not have the
same justiﬁcation in the AR(2) model as in the AR(1) model.
19This arises partly because of the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on the second lag of openness
(correspondingto β2), whichmakes azerolong-run effect harder toreject, andpartly becauseα1+α2 ≈ 1
in these models, which tends to blow up the ratio of coefﬁcients that forms the long-run effect.
19allow for ﬁxed effects, the restriction that β1 +β2 =0is rejected at the 20% level, and
typically at the 5% level. This suggests that the effect of greater openness persists into
the long run.
Our simple heterogeneity tests reject the null of no individual effects in column
7, and are close to doing so in the other two cases. This suggests that, as expected,
unobserved heterogeneity is present, and the pooled OLS estimates are likely to be
inconsistent. An alternative way to address this problem is to look for samples that
are more likely to be homogenous. For this reason, we follow our earlier cross-section
analysis, and split the sample into a higher-income group (Table 8) and a lower-income
group (Table 9).
We consider the higher-income group ﬁrst, in Table 8. In this group of countries,
t h ee v i d e n c ef o ras i g n i ﬁcant short-run effect is much weaker than before. We typically
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two lags of openness are jointly insigniﬁcant,
or the alternative null that β1 + β2 =0 . Consistent with this pattern, the long-run
effects are imprecisely estimated for all estimation methods other than Within Groups.
At ﬁrst glance, these ﬁndings might seem to go against our earlier OLS and GMM
cross-section results, in which openness and ﬁnancial development were positively as-
sociated in the higher-income sample. One reason for weaker results in the higher-
income panel may be that its cross-section dimension (N =3 5 ) is unusually small for
an application of GMM. It is interesting to note that our test for individual effects does
not reject the null of a common intercept at conventional levels. If taken at face value,
the lack of variation in the individual effects in the higher-income group implies that
panel data methods are not required. Simple cross-section or pooled OLS estimates
may provide a reasonable estimate of the long-run effect, and have the advantage that
they retain the information in the “between” variation.
The results for the lower-income group are shown in Table 9. In this sample, we
ﬁnd much stronger evidence that increased openness leads to greater ﬁnancial depth in
the short run. This effect is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in all seven models. Again we
ﬁnd evidence that the coefﬁcient on the second lag of openness is negatively signed,
and can see that it is hard to estimate the long-run effect precisely in a sample of this
size, with the exception of the SYS-GMM-2 estimates in column 7. But the restriction
that β1 + β2 =0is usually either rejected, or is close to being rejected.
The diagnostic tests support the identifying assumptions, and overall we conclude
that there is strong evidence that changes in openness are followed by changes in ﬁnan-
cial depth, which persist at least over the medium term. In the whole sample, or the
subset of poorer countries, there is fairly strong evidence that the effect persists into the
long run. In the group of higher-income countries, the estimates are less precise, which
may reﬂect the small cross-section dimension of the relevant panel. An alternative ex-
20planation is that the stronger cross-section results for the higher-income sample are an
artifact of individual effects, but we ﬁnd relatively little statistical evidence for these
individual effects in the higher-income panel.
7 Conclusions
The determinants of ﬁnancial development have become a focus of recent research.
In this paper, we have examined whether ﬁnance is inﬂuenced by external trade, per-
haps for the political economy reasons identiﬁed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), or
the risk diversiﬁcation considerations emphasized by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002).
The ﬁrst sections of the paper emphasize cross-section results, in which the Frankel-
Romer measure of “natural openness” is used to isolate exogenous variation in open-
ness. Whether using OLS or instrumental variable procedures, we ﬁnd strong evidence
that trade promotes bank-based ﬁnancial development in higher-income countries, but
not in the lower-income group.
These ﬁndings may be contaminated by omitted variables that are correlated with
openness. The main contribution of the paper is to use panel data to examine whether
increases in openness are followed by increases in ﬁnancial development, and whether
this effect persists into the long run. We ﬁnd strong support for this hypothesis in the
sample as a whole, and in the lower-income group. The results are robust to several
different estimation methods, and the short-run effects in particular are not sensitive to
the precise choice of moment conditions. For the higher-income group, the panel data
results are weaker than in the cross-section.
Our results suggest that the long-run effects of trade go beyond those envisaged in
traditional models. But as with much of the empirical literature on ﬁnancial develop-
ment, it is not clear whether the effects work primarily through the demand for external
ﬁnance, or through improving the supply side, or some interaction of the two. For ex-
ample, it may be that greater openness is associated with changes in sectoral structure
that increase the demand for external ﬁnance. Alternatively, it may be that increased
exposure to foreign competition inﬂuences the supply-side more directly, as envisaged
in Rajan and Zingales (2003). Discriminating between the various explanations is a
difﬁcult task, but may be an interesting area for further research, given the ﬁndings we
present here.
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Figure 1: The increase in openness
 
 
This figure shows kernel density plots of the distributions of average openness in 
1960-64 (left) and 1995-99 (right). The figure shows the trend towards increased 
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Figure 2: Trade and finance
 
 
These figures show scatter plots of the logarithm of LLY, and the aggregate index 









































































































−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1
Log of openness
coef = .18732092, (robust) se = .10315694, t = 1.82









































































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Log of openness
coef = .39212878, (robust) se = .38869956, t = 1.01
Openness and FD (conditional)
Figure 3: Partial scatter plots
 
 
These figures show partial scatter plots of the logarithm of LLY, and the aggregate 
index FD, against the logarithm of openness. These are the partial associations 
between trade and finance, conditional on the logarithm of GDP and legal origin 
dummies. Table 1. The Variables 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
OPENC  The sum of exports and imports over GDP (at current prices)  Penn World Table 6.1 
OPENK  The sum of exports and imports over GDP (at international prices)  Penn World Table 6.1 
RGDPCH  Average real GDP per capita over 1988-90 (cross-section study only)  Penn World Table 6.1 
CTRADE  Natural propensity to trade, as derived by Frankel and Romer. Based on 
aggregated fitted values of bilateral trade equation. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) 
LLY  Ratio of liquid liabilities of financial system (currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbanks) to GDP 
FSD 





Ratio of commercial bank assets to sum of commercial and central bank assets  FSD 
OVC  Ratio of overhead costs to total assets of the banks  FSD 
NIM  Bank interest income minus interest expenses over total assets  FSD 
MCAP  Ratio of the value of listed shares to GDP  FSD 
TVT  Ratio of the value of shares traded on domestic exchanges to GDP  FSD 
TOR  Ratio of the value of shares traded to market capitalization  FSD 
FD  First principal component of LLY, PRIVO, BTOT, NIM, MCAP, TVT, TOR (all in 
logs) 
See text 
FDSIZE  First principal component of LLY and MCAP (all in logs)  See text 
FDEFF  First principal component of OVC, NIM, TVT and TOR (all in logs)  See text 
FDBANK  First principal component of LLY, PRIVO, BTOT, OVC and NIM (all in logs)  See text 
FDSTOCK  First principal component of MCAP, TVT and TOR (all in logs)  See text 
FDEPTH  First principal component of LLY, PRIVO and BTOT.  This index is used in the 
panel data analysis. 
See text 
LEGOR_UK  British legal origin  GDN 
LEGOR_FR French  legal  origin  GDN 
LEGOR_GE  German legal origin  GDN 
LEGOR_SC  Scandinavian legal origin  GDN 
 
Key to Table 1: FSD – Financial Structure Database introduced by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). GDN – Global Development Network Database, 2002  
 
Table 2. The indices of financial development 
 
Measure       Proportion  LLY  PRIVO   BTOT      OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
FD  0.63 0.38  0.40  0.30  -0.32  -0.36  0.36  0.38  0.32 
                  
FDSIZE  0.80 0.71         0.71     
                  
FDEFF  0.68      -0.48  -0.51    0.52  0.49 
                  
FDBANK  0.71 0.48  0.48  0.38  -0.43  -0.46       
                  
FDSTOCK 0.86         0.55  0.62  0.56 
                  
FDEPTH  0.74 0.60  0.63  0.49          
 
Notes:  This table shows how our various indicators of financial development (FD, FDSIZE, FDEFF, FDBANK, FDSTOCK, FDEPTH) are constructed, from 
the raw data on different measures of financial development. We construct indicators from the raw data using the first principal component of a number of 
variables, namely the linear combination of the variables that has the highest sample variance, subject to the constraint that the sum-of-squares of the 
coefficients equals unity. The table shows the weights that each index places on each of the (standardized) variables, and the proportion of the variance in 
the original data that is explained by the first principal component.  
 
The raw measures used are the natural logarithms of LLY = the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and nonbanks) to GDP; PRIVO = the ratio of credit issued to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries to GDP; 
BTOT= the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets; OVC = the ratio of overhead costs to total assets of the 
banks; NIM = the bank interest income minus interest expenses over total assets; MCAP = the ratio of the value of shares listed on domestic exchanges 
(market capitalization) to GDP; TVT = the ratio of the value of shares traded on domestic exchanges to GDP; TOR = the ratio of the value of shares traded 
on domestic exchanges to total market capitalization.                                                            
 
 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: 1990-2001  
=============================================================== 
 
A.  Summary Statistics for Openness and financial development measures 
 
Variable  Observation         Mean    Std. Dev.          Min           Max 
OPENC  101 59.73 30.71 14.99 140.90 
LLY  93 0.44 0.31 0.05 1.87 
PRIVO  99 0.42 0.38 0.02 1.65 
BTOT  98 0.77 0.21 0.17 1.00 
OVC  92 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.11 
NIM  91 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.17 
MCAP  67 0.36 0.37 0.01 1.76 
TVT  68 0.21 0.29 0.00 1.34 
TOR  67 0.42 0.42 0.01 1.92 
FD  59 0.00 2.25 -5.22 3.45 
FDSIZE  61 0.00 1.26 -3.06 2.58 
FDEFF  66 0.00 1.64 -3.44 3.16 
FDBANK  82 0.00 1.88 -4.80 3.51 
FDSTOCK  67 0.00 1.60 -3.99 2.41 
 
 
B. Correlations between openness and the existing financial development measures 
 
 OPENC  LLY  PRIVO  BTOT  OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
OPENC  1.00            
LLY  0.22  1.00           
PRIVO  0.18  0.86  1.00        
BTOT  0.15  0.50  0.64 1.00       
OVC  -0.21  -0.56  -0.54 -0.46 1.00      
NIM  -0.15 -0.57  -0.59 -0.51 0.86 1.00      
MCAP  0.24 0.58  0.71 0.41 -0.35 -0.40 1.00     
TVT  0.04 0.54  0.77 0.44 -0.32 -0.37 0.79 1.00  
TOR  -0.23 0.32  0.47 0.38 -0.29 -0.25 0.23 0.60 1.00
 
C. Correlations among openness and the new financial development measures 
 
  OPENC  FD  FDSIZE  FDEFF  FDBANK  FDSTOCK
OPENC  1.00        
FD  0.27  1.00       
FDSIZE  0.30  0.92 1.00      
FDEFF  0.15  0.95 0.80 1.00    
FDBANK  0.27  0.94 0.84 0.87 1.00   
FDSTOCK  0.03  0.86 0.82 0.86 0.63  1.00 Table 4. External trade and financial development (whole sample), 1990-2001 
 
  FD  FDSIZE FDEFF FDBANK FDSTOCK 
          
      OPENC (OLS)  0.64  0.244  0.516  0.56  -0.497 
 (0.08)*  -0.25  (0.04)**  (0.07)*  (0.06)* 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.138  0.139  0.238  0.532  -0.883 
 (0.78)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.15)  (0.01)*** 
          
      (a) R-squared  0.59  0.60  0.57  0.52  0.52 
      (b) First-stage F1  69.07 75.75  68.55  68.60  87.56 
      (c) Pagan-Hall2  0.32 0.13  0.14  0.27  0.10 
      (d) Wu-Hausman3  0.16 0.49  0.29  0.92  0.06 
      (e) C statistic4  0.17 0.47  0.28  0.91  0.08 
          
Observations 57  56  62  79 64 
 
Notes: This Table shows the point estimates and p-values for openness in OLS and GMM estimates, using 
five alternative measures of financial development as the dependent variable. The coefficients and 
heteroskedasticity-robust p values correspond to the natural logarithm of openness. Table 1 describes all 
variables in detail. Other explanatory variables included in each of the regressions are the natural logarithm 
of initial real GDP, and one or more dummy variables for legal origin. In the GMM estimates, the instrument 
is the Frankel-Romer measure of the propensity to trade (CTRADE). All regressions exclude outliers, as 
identified by a preliminary median regression (see text).  Most of the diagnostics are based on 2SLS rather 
than GMM. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
¹ This tests the significance of the excluded instrument (CTRADE) in the first-stage regression of 2SLS. 
² This tests the homoskedasticity of the system of equations when 2SLS is used. Based on Pagan and Hall 
(1983). 
³ This is a Wu-Hausman test that the difference between the OLS and 2SLS coefficients is not systematic.  
⁴ This is a GMM-based test of the null hypothesis that OPENC is orthogonal to the disturbances. 
   
  Table 5. External trade and financial development (subsamples), 1990-2001 
 
A. Higher-income  group 
 
 FD  FDSIZE  FDEFF  FDBANK  FDSTOCK 
         
      OPENC (OLS)  0.88  0.472  0.442  1.563  -0.371 
 (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.08)*  (0.00)***  (0.09)* 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.831  0.514  0.264  1.254  -0.431 
 (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.27)  (0.00)***  (0.03)** 
         
   (a) R-squared  0.77  0.72  0.55  0.84  0.58 
   (b) First stage F  46.99  44.95  46.46  30.98  55.16 
   (c) Pagan-Hall   0.47  0.89  0.07  0.09  0.48 
   (d) Wu-Hausman  0.78  0.78  0.33  0.05  0.63 
   (e) C statistic  0.74  0.73  0.27  0.05  0.59 
          
Observations 27  28  34  26 34 
 
 
B. Lower-income  group 
 
 FD  FDSIZE  FDEFF  FDBANK FDSTOCK 
          
      OPENC (OLS)  -1.023  -0.435  -1.565  -0.221  -0.753 
 (0.13)  (0.23)  (0.01)***  (0.63)  (0.19) 
      OPENC (GMM)  -4.027  -1.357  -3.994  -0.723  -1.301 
 (0.05)**  (0.02)**  (0.01)***  (0.36)  (0.25) 
          
      (a) R-squared  0.26  0.20  0.18  0.21  0.22 
      (b) First stage F  6.80  22.04  10.26  25.66  19.34 
      (c) Pagan-Hall   0.88  0.29  0.92  0.80  0.15 
      (d) Wu-Hausman  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.41  0.48 
      (e) C statistic  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.39  0.46 
          
Observations 28  28  29  51  29 
 
Notes:  The upper panel is based on high-income and upper-middle countries while 
lower panel is for lower-middle and low-income countries, as classified in the GDN 









 Table 6. External trade and financial development (whole sample) 
 




Instrument set  None  None  Full  Reduced  Reduced 
Observations 520  520  432  432  520 
          
Lag 1 FDEPTH  1.032  0.775  0.689  0.453  1.100 
  (61.620)***  (19.24) ***  (9.23) ***  (2.15) **  (24.71) *** 
Lag 1 OPENC  0.071  0.621  0.973  1.114  0.421 
  (1.14)  (3.52) ***  (3.80) ***  (1.92) *  (1.77) * 
          
Serial correlation (m1) p-value      0.00  0.45  0.00 
Serial correlation (m2) p-value      0.02  0.12  0.01 
Sargan p-value      0.44  0.38  0.03 
Granger causality p-value  0.25   0.00  0.00  0.08  0.08 
LR effect point estimate  -2.229  2.765  3.126  2.038  -4.206 
(Standard error)  (2.51)  (0.85) ***  (1.26) ***  (1.30)   (3.46)  
 
Notes:  88 countries, 1960-1999. Year dummies are included in all models (coefficients not reported). Figures in parentheses below point estimates are t-ratios. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The GMM results reported here are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics; the standard errors are based on the finite sample 
adjustment of Windmeijer (2005). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. First-order serial correlation is expected due to first-differencing, but 
identification of the models relies on the absence of second-order serial correlation. 
The Sargan test is used to assess the overidentifying restrictions and is asymptotically distributed as χ². The test uses the minimised value of the corresponding two-step GMM 
estimator. The difference Sargan test is used to test the additional moment conditions used by the system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator. The Granger causality test examines the 
null hypothesis that financial development is not Granger-caused by openness; the test statistic is criterion based, using restricted and unrestricted models (see text). 
The LR effect is the point estimate of the long-run effect of openness on financial development. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method. 
 
 
 Table 7. External trade and financial development (whole sample) 
Dependent variable: FDEPTH  OLS levels  WG  DIF-GMM  DIF-GMM  SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM-1   SYS-GMM-2 
Instrument set  None  None  Full  Reduced  Reduced  Reduced  Reduced 
Observations  432 432  346 344 432 432  432 
              
Lag 1 FDEPTH  1.251  0.824  0.653  0.388  1.250  1.264  1.147 
  (17.10) ***  (14.14) ***  (3.01) ***  (1.43)   (14.99) ***  (14.93) ***  (6.52) *** 
Lag 2 FDEPTH  -0.250  -0.253  -0.205  -0.155  -0.294  -0.344  -0.258 
  (-3.11) ***  (-4.01) ***  (-2.47) **  (-1.76) *  (-3.61) ***  (-4.20) ***  (-2.48) ** 
Lag 1 OPENC  0.731  0.803  1.240  1.235  0.968  1.174  0.914 
  (3.10) ***  (3.65) ***  (2.48) **  (2.78) ***  (3.72) ***  (2.87) ***  (2.69) *** 
Lag 2 OPENC  -0.652  0.027  0.037  0.222  -0.518  -0.547  -0.434 
  (-2.96)***  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.84)  (-2.05) **  (-2.55) **  (-1.94) * 
              
Serial correlation (m1) p-value      0.06  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Serial correlation (m2) p-value      0.86  0.95  0.36  0.53  0.36 
Sargan p-value      0.50  0.29  0.20  0.26  0.11 
Diff-Sargan p-value          0.21  0.31  0.05 
Heterogeneity test p-value          0.16  0.23  0.05 
Granger causality p-value  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Test of β1+β2=0  p-value 0.25 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.16 0.04  0.14 
LR effect point estimate  -47.369  1.935  2.314  1.900  10.328  7.856  4.330 
(Standard error)  (581.61)  (0.59) ***  (1.49)   (0.86) **  (14.50)  (7.84)  (3.25) 
Notes:  88 countries, 1960-1999. Year dummies are included in all models (coefficients not reported). Figures in parentheses below point estimates are t-ratios. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The GMM results reported here are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics; the standard errors are based on the finite sample 
adjustment of Windmeijer (2005). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. First-order serial correlation is expected due to first-differencing, but identification of the models 
relies on the absence of second-order serial correlation. The Sargan test is used to assess the overidentifying restrictions and is asymptotically distributed as χ². The test uses the minimised value of the 
corresponding two-step GMM estimator. The difference Sargan test is used to test the additional moment conditions used by the system GMM estimators in which SYS GMM uses the standard moment 
conditions, while SYS GMM (Modified 1) only uses the lagged first-differences of FDEPTH dated t-1 as instruments in levels and SYS GMM (Modified 2) only uses lagged first-differences of OPENC 
dated t-1 as instruments in levels. The heterogeneity test is used to test the null that there are no individual effects (see text). The Granger causality test examines the null hypothesis that financial 
development is not Granger-caused by openness; the test statistic is criterion based, using restricted and unrestricted models (see text). The LR effect is the point estimate of the long-run effect of 
openness on financial development. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method.  
Table 8. External trade and financial development (higher-income group) 
  
Dependent variable: FDEPTH  OLS levels  WG  DIF-GMM  DIF-GMM  SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM-1  SYS-GMM-2 
Instrument  set  None  None  Full  Reduced Reduced Reduced  Reduced 
Observations  185  185 150 150 185 185  185 
           
Lag  1  FDEPTH  1.166  0.753 0.368 0.123 1.173 1.218  0.957 
  (10.01) ***  (8.65) ***  (1.98)   (0.64)   (9.66) ***  (7.01) ***  (2.75) *** 
Lag  2  FDEPTH  -0.183  -0.298 -0.273 -0.214 -0.149 -0.393  -0.154 
  (-1.38)   (-3.25) ***  (-2.12) **  (-1.91) *  (-1.19)   (-3.02)***  (-1.10)  
Lag  1  OPENC  0.686  1.237 0.842 0.734 0.814 0.734  0.586 
  (1.58)   (3.10) ***  (1.11)   (1.31)   (1.47)   (1.60)   (0.75)  
Lag  2  OPENC  -0.610  -0.013 -0.135 0.063  -0.374 -0.238  -0.573 
  (-1.50)    (-0.03) (-0.42) (0.29)  (-1.04) (-0.44)  (-1.16) 
           
Serial correlation (m1) p-value      0.22  0.87  0.02  0.01  0.07 
Serial correlation (m2) p-value      0.33  0.47  0.41  0.97  0.68 
Sargan  p-value      0.92 0.71 0.79 0.53  0.48 
Diff-Sargan  p-value       0.68  0.17  0.12 
Heterogeneity  test  P-value       0.78  0.28  0.41 
Granger  causality  p-value  0.29    0.00 0.54 0.66 0.56 0.55  1.00 
Test of β1+β2=0  p-value  0.47  0.00 0.21 0.08 0.39 0.27  1.00 
LR effect point estimate  4.574  2.245  0.780  0.731  -18.448  8.582  0.066 
(Standard error)  (13.18)  (0.747) ***  (0.93)  (0.58)   (81.76)  (6.72)  (4.56) 
 
Notes:  35 countries, 1960-1999. For other notes please see Table 7.  
Table 9. External trade and financial development (lower-income group) 
 
Dependent variable: FDEPTH  OLS levels  WG  DIF-GMM  DIF-GMM  SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM-1  SYS-GMM-2 
Instrument  set  None  None  Full  Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced 
Observations  247  247 194 194 247 247 247 
          
Lag  1  FDEPTH  1.279  0.849 1.054 0.930 1.202 1.250 0.961 
  (15.46) ***  (10.16) ***  (4.40) ***  (2.33) **  (13.43) ***  (9.70) ***  (5.51) *** 
Lag  2  FDEPTH  -0.356  -0.252 -0.306 -0.309 -0.366 -0.380 -0.258 
  (-4.32) ***  (-2.77) ***  (-3.23) ***  (-2.61) ***  (-5.12) ***  (-4.64) ***  (-2.45) ** 
Lag  1  OPENC  0.756  0.640 2.258 2.281 0.933 1.262 1.307 
  (2.99) ***  (2.52) ***  (2.65) ***  (1.72) *  (2.76) ***  (1.87) *  (3.39) *** 
Lag  2  OPENC  -0.666  -0.207 -0.201 -0.204 -0.665 -0.703 -0.453 
  (-2.73) ***  (-0.67)  (-0.55)  (-0.45)  (-2.99) ***  (-2.36) **  (-1.42)  
          
Serial  correlation  (m1)  p-value      0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Serial  correlation  (m2)  p-value      0.20 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.35 
Sargan  p-value      0.74 0.40 0.53 0.47 0.42 
Diff-Sargan  p-value       0.65  0.57  0.45 
Heterogeneity  test  P-value       0.51  0.32  0.13 
Granger causality p-value  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.06  0.06   0.05   0.02  
Test of β1+β2=0  p-value  0.40  0.19 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.04 0.17 
LR  effect  point  estimate  1.158  1.075 8.140 5.484 1.640 4.332 2.877 
(Standard error)  (1.13)  (0.80)   (7.37)   (7.26)   (1.63)   (4.74)   (0.94)*** 
 
Notes:  53 countries, 1960-1999.  For other notes please see Table 7. Appendix Tables 
 
A1. External trade and financial development (whole sample), 1990-2001 
  LLY  PRIVO BTOT OVC NIM  MCAP TVT  TOR 
           
      OPENC (OLS)  0.267 0.221  0.024  -0.101  -0.228  -0.033 -0.702  -0.709 
  (0.01)*** (0.04)**  (0.68)  (0.44)  (0.02)**  (0.86)  (0.05)**  (0.00)*** 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.272 0.077  -0.046  -0.263  -0.193  -0.148 -0.984  -0.879 
  (0.04)** (0.64)  (0.52)  (0.14) (0.24)  (0.59)  (0.06)*  (0.00)*** 
             
  (a) R-squared  0.62 0.70  0.42  0.21  0.49 0.50 0.53 0.47 
  (b) First stage F ¹  70.30 70.30  68.73  65.59  65.30 82.88 82.82 82.88 
  (c) Pagan-Hall²  0.45 0.90  0.43  0.58  0.42 0.29 0.47 0.67 
  (d) Wu-Hausman³    0.96 0.10  0.22  0.57  0.49 0.12 0.15 0.26 
  (e) C statistic⁴  0.96 0.11  0.22  0.55  0.46 0.13 0.15 0.24 
             
   Observations  89 89  88  81  80 59 60 59 
 
Notes:  This table reports the coefficients and heteroskedasticity-robust p values for the natural logarithm of openness, for eight alternative dependent 
variables (in logarithms) using OLS and GMM. Table 1 describes all variables in detail. Other explanatory variables included in each of the regressions are 
the natural logarithm of initial real GDP, and dummy variables for British, French and German legal origin. In GMM estimates, the instrument is the 
Frankel-Romer measure of the propensity to trade (CTRADE). All regressions exclude outliers, as identified by a preliminary median regression (see text).  
Most of the diagnostics are based on 2SLS rather than GMM. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
¹ This tests the significance of the excluded instrument (CTRADE) in the first-stage regression of 2SLS. 
² This tests the homoskedasticity of the system of equations when 2SLS is used. Based on Pagan and Hall (1983). 
³ This is a Wu-Hausman test that the difference between the OLS and 2SLS coefficients is not systematic.  
⁴ This is a GMM-based test of the null hypothesis that OPENC is orthogonal to the disturbances. 
 A2. External trade and financial development (subsamples), 1990-2001 
 
A. Higher-income  group 
 LLY  PRIVO  BTOT  OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
             
      OPENC (OLS)  0.468  0.177  0.044  -0.602  -0.505  0.057  -0.334  -0.448 
  (0.00)***  (0.14)    (0.04)**  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.67)  (0.35)   (0.08)* 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.525  0.313  0.044  -0.63  -0.475  -0.093  -0.841  -0.735 
  (0.00)*** (0.04)**  (0.09)*  (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.72)  (0.09)*  (0.02)** 
               
 (a) R-squared  0.72  0.71  0.58  0.53  0.64  0.48  0.40  0.32 
 (b) First stage F  31.68  31.68  31.91  31.68  31.68  31.68  31.68  31.68 
 (c) Pagan-Hall  0.06  0.14  0.85  0.05  0.43  0.56  0.67  0.71 
 (d) Wu-Hausman   0.48  0.56  0.89  0.20  0.72  0.07  0.18  0.50 
 (e) C statistic  0.41  0.51  0.87  0.19  0.69  0.07  0.14  0.42 
  Observations  29  29  28  29  29  29  29  29 
 
B. Lower-income  group 
 LLY  PRIVO  BTOT  OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
             
      OPENC (OLS)  0.146  0.182  -0.027  0.365  0.183  -0.49  -0.947  -1.105 
  (0.28)  (0.23)  (0.79) (0.03)**  (0.29)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.01)*** 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.004  -0.266  -0.192  0.275  0.276  -0.327  -1.663  -1.584 
  (0.99)  (0.41)  (0.23) (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.68) (0.26) (0.07)* 
             
 (a) R-squared  0.34  0.45  0.25  0.16  0.10  0.25  0.20  0.18 
 (b) First stage F  31.28  31.28  31.28  22.22  22.17  25.20  26.25  25.20 
 (c) Pagan-Hall  0.36  0.92  0.63  0.34  0.51  0.31  0.33  0.77 
 (d) Wu-Hausman   0.41  0.05  0.16  0.88  0.74  0.58  0.46  0.34 
 (e) C statistic  0.40  0.08  0.19  0.87  0.73  0.55  0.44  0.32 
  Observations  60  60  60  52  51  29  30  29 
Notes:  The upper panel is based on high-income and upper-middle countries while lower panel is for lower-middle and low-income countries, as classified in the GDN Growth Database in World 
Bank. For other notes, please see Table 4.   A3. External trade and financial development (whole sample), 1990-2001 
  LLY  PRIVO BTOT OVC NIM  MCAP TVT  TOR 
           
      OPENC (OLS)  0.187  0.192  0.035  -0.129  -0.077  0.104  -0.613  -0.713 
 (0.07)*  (0.11)  (0.58)  (0.34)  (0.53)  (0.61)  (0.10)*  (0.00)*** 
      OPENC (GMM)  -0.016  -0.228  -0.093  -0.115  -0.134  -0.235  -1.27  -1.094 
  (0.93) (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.52)  (0.39) (0.34) (0.01)***  (0.00)*** 
             
  (a) R-squared  0.46  0.60  0.39  0.19  0.32  0.42  0.48  0.40 
  (b) F test¹  72.54  79.72  78.34  68.56  68.46  84.26  85.63  84.26 
  (c) Pagan-Hall²  0.59  0.97  0.46  0.64  0.31  0.27  0.53  0.48 
  (d) Wu-Hausman³    0.13  0.01  0.10  0.90  0.61  0.08  0.05  0.08 
  (e) C statistic⁴  0.14 0.02  0.11  0.90  0.58 0.08 0.07 0.09 
             
   Observations  93  99  98  92  91  67  68  67 
 
Notes: As previously, but these regressions do not exclude outliers. A4. External trade and financial development (subsamples), 1990-2001 
 
A. Higher-income group 
 LLY  PRIVO  BTOT  OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
             
      OPENC (OLS)  0.290  0.210  0.049  -0.547  -0.457  0.224  -0.254  -0.443 
  (0.04)**  (0.13)  (0.03)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.24)  (0.49)  (0.08)* 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.318  0.112  0.041  -0.458  -0.445  -0.235  -0.645  -0.547 
  (0.03)**  (0.44)  (0.04)** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.34)  (0.04)** (0.01)*** 
             
 (a) R-squared  0.62  0.55  0.59  0.40  0.55  0.36  0.36  0.34 
 (b) First stage F ¹  41.33  53.26  52.54  51.11  51.11  51.11  51.11  51.11 
 (c) Pagan-Hall²  0.36  0.07  0.80    0.58  0.51  0.74  0.92 
 (d) Wu-Hausman³   0.74  0.36  0.66  0.23  0.90  0.08  0.21  0.57 
 (e) C statistics⁴  0.71  0.31  0.62   0.89  0.08 0.16 0.44 
  Observations  31  37  36  36  36  67  36  36 
 
B. Lower-income group 
 LLY  PRIVO  BTOT  OVC  NIM  MCAP  TVT  TOR 
             
      OPENC (OLS)  0.115  0.174  0.001  0.331  0.256  -0.07  -1.085  -1.129 
  (0.47)  (0.37)  (1.00) (0.10)* (0.15)  (0.88) (0.18) (0.01)*** 
      OPENC (GMM)  -0.376  -0.687  -0.243  0.529  0.437  -0.626  -2.827  -2.53 
 (0.29)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.45)  (0.10)*  (0.04)** 
             
 (a) R-squared  0.20  0.29  0.24  0.12  0.09  0.14  0.13  0.17 
 (b) First stage F¹  33.82  33.82  33.82  24.41  24.40  20.03  22.74  20.03 
 (c) Pagan-Hall²  0.65  0.96  0.75  0.55  0.83  0.34  0.42  0.85 
 (d) Wu-Hausman³   0.06  0.00  0.08  0.43  0.41  0.35  0.09  0.03 
 (e) C statistics⁴ 0.10 0.03 0.12  0.45 0.42 0.33  0.14  0.08 
  Observations  62  62  62  56  55  31  32  31 
 
Notes: As previously, but these regressions do not exclude outliers.      
 
A5. External trade and financial development (higher-income group, OPENK), 1990-
2001 
 
  FD  FDSIZE FDEFF FDBANK FDSTOCK 
         
      OPENK (OLS)  0.763  0.460  0.307  1.223  -0.456 
 (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.18)  (0.00)***  (0.03)** 
      OPENK (GMM)  0.708  0.414  0.245  1.046  -0.400 
 (0.00)***  (0.02)**  (0.28)  (0.00)***  (0.02)** 
          
    (a) R-squared  0.78  0.71  0.53  0.71  0.61 
    (b) First stage F¹  37.86  34.58  39.04  32.24  44.69 
    (c) Pagan-Hall²   0.22  0.85  0.14  0.67  0.66 
    (d) Wu-Hausman³  0.61  0.78  0.68  0.20  0.51 
    (e) C statistics⁴ 0.54  0.74  0.63 0.14  0.47 
          
     Observations  26  29  34  28  34 
 
Notes:  These regressions are based on higher-income group for OPENK instead of 
OPENC. For other notes, please see earlier tables.       
 
   
External trade and financial development (higher-income group), 1990-2001 
 
 FD  FDSIZE  FDEFF  FDBANK  FDSTOCK 
         
      OPENC (OLS)  0.019  0.008  -0.011  0.028  -0.009 
 (0.00)***  (0.05)**  (0.11)  (0.00)***  (0.17) 
      OPENC (GMM)  0.017  0.011  -0.003  0.021  -0.013 
 (0.01)***  (0.05)**  (0.65)  (0.00)***  (0.04)** 
          
    (a) R-squared  0.82  0.66  0.55  0.88  0.36 
    (b) First stage F¹  22.44  18.29  22.22  11.61  30.04 
    (c) Pagan-Hall²   0.97  0.92  0.36  0.82  0.83 
    (d) Wu-Hausman³  0.63  0.43  0.08  0.02  0.16 
    (e) C statistic⁴ 0.58 0.34  0.09 0.03  0.09 
          
     Observations  27  29  34  26  34 
 
Notes:  These regressions are based on higher-income group in which the first principal component for 
any financial indicator is the linear combination of measures that are not in logarithms. OPENC is not in 




  A6. External trade and financial development (whole sample), 1990-2001 
 
  FD  FDSIZE FDEFF FDBANK FDSTOCK 
          
      OPENC (OLS)  0.392  0.346  -0.036  0.487  -0.438 
 (0.32)  (0.15)  (0.91)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
      OPENC (GMM)  -0.349  -0.081  -0.336  -0.008  -0.964 
 (0.56)  (0.82)  (0.420  (0.99)  (0.01)*** 
          
      (a) R-squared  0.54  0.49  0.41  0.48  0.47 
      (b) First stage F¹  72.39  75.47  83.21  61.91  84.26 
      (c) Pagan-Hall²   0.30  0.20  0.70  0.29  0.48 
      (d) Wu-Hausman³  0.05  0.06  0.29  0.20  0.04 
      (e) C statistic⁴ 0.07  0.08 0.28  0.22  0.05 
          
      Observations  59  61  66  82  67 
 
Notes: as previously, but these regressions do not exclude outliers. 





























 A7. External trade and financial development (subsamples), 1990-2001 
 
a. Higher-income  group 
 
 FD  FDSIZE  FDEFF  FDBANK  FDSTOCK 
         
     OPENC (OLS)  1.048  0.602  0.592  1.303  -0.156 
 (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.03)**  (0.00)***  (0.55) 
     OPENC (GMM)  0.707  0.421  0.377  1.204  -0.47 
 (0.06)*  (0.03)**  (0.18)  (0.00)***  (0.03)** 
         
   (a) R-squared  0.71  0.63  0.52  0.69  0.38 
   (b) First stage F¹  38.17  38.03  51.11  38.17  51.11 
   (c) Pagan-Hall²   0.32  0.21  0.08  0.88  0.71 
   (d)W-Hausman³  0.17  0.35  0.28  0.61  0.16 
   (e) C statistic⁴ 0.16 0.31 0.23  0.57  0.12 
          
     Observations  29  30  36  29  36 
 
 
b. Lower-income  group 
 
  FD  FDSIZE FDEFF FDBANK FDSTOCK 
         
      OPENC (OLS)  -0.775  0.111  -1.004  -0.309  -0.854 
 (0.40)  (0.82)  (0.17)  (0.55)  (0.16) 
      OPENC (GMM)  -2.78  -1.029  -2.147  -1.879  -2.29 
 (0.20)  (0.39)  (0.16)  (0.10)*  (0.11) 
          
      (a) R-squared  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.19  0.14 
      (b) F test¹  20.06  20.03  20.06  25.02  20.03 
      (c) Pagan-Hall²   0.29  0.48  0.39  0.79  0.40 
      (d) Wu-Hausman³  0.10  0.11  0.22  0.04  0.08 
      (e) C statistic⁴ 0.14  0.15 0.24  0.09  0.12 
          
      Observations  30  31  30  53  31 
 
Notes: As previously, but these regressions do not exclude outliers.   
    
A8. Panel data results using only information on LLY to measure financial development 
 






Instrument  set  Reduced Reduced Reduced 
      
Lag 1 LLY  1.293  1.139  1.163 
 (12.21)***  (6.58)***  (9.48)*** 
Lag 2 LLY  -0.403  -0.086  -0.475 
 (-2.59)***  (-0.29)  (-4.34)*** 
Lag 1 OPENC  0.120  0.066  0.224 
 (1.84)*  (-0.83)  (4.29)*** 
Lag 2 OPENC  -0.056  -0.083  -0.054 
  (-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.92) 
      
Serial correlation (m1) p-value  0.03  0.18  0.01 
Serial correlation (m2) p-value  0.93  0.94  0.43 
Sargan  p-value  0.17 0.92 0.67 
Diff-Sargan  p-value 0.15 0.99 0.97 
Heterogeneity test P-value  0.27  1.00  0.69 
Granger causality p-value  0.05  0.13  0.09 
LR  effect  point  estimate  0.528 2.794 0.546 
(Standard error)  (0.58)   (6.08)  (0.21) *** 
 
Notes: 88 countries in total, 35 higher-income countries and 53 lower-income countries; 1960-1999. For other notes 
please see Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 